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INDIAN CONVERTIBLE BONDS WITH UNSPECIFIED TERMS 







Indian convertible bonds have two peculiar features that make them 
possibly unique in the world: a) the bonds are compulsorily converted 
into equity without any option, and b) the conversion terms are not 
specified at the time of issue but are left to be determined 
subsequently by the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) who is the 
government functionary regulating capital issues in India. 
 
A naive model would say that the market simply forms an estimate of 
the likely conversion terms and then values the bond as if these terms 
were prespecified.  This paper examines the market prices of one of 
the largest issues of Indian convertible bonds with unspecified terms. 
 The empirical investigation convincingly rejects the naive model and 
demonstrates that changes in the market's expectation of the 
conversion terms are a significant factor affecting the pricing 
relationship.  These changes are significantly correlated with the 
stock price itself.  We do not, however, find any evidence that the 
market expects the CCI to adjust the conversion terms on the basis of 
the actual market price to protect the bondholder.  But, there is 
strong evidence that changes in expected conversion terms affect the 
share price through the dilution effect.  Since the unspecified terms 
have only added to the uncertainty of the bondholders without giving 
them any perceived benefits we recommend that this system should be 
abolished.   
 
In a companion paper, Barua and Varma (1991) present a theoretical 
valuation model for the Indian convertible bonds with unspecified 







INDIAN CONVERTIBLE BONDS WITH UNSPECIFIED TERMS 




Convertible bonds are well known securities throughout the world.   
However, recent Indian convertible bonds have some peculiar features 
that make them possibly unique.  First, the bonds are compulsorily 
redeemed by conversion into equity. There is no option in this regard 
either to the bondholder or to the issuing corporation.  This is less 
serious than it might appear because the conversion terms have 
generally been so favourable as to make the conversion always 
beneficial to the bondholder.  Therefore, even if the bond were to be 
vested with a genuine option to convert, such a deep-in-the-money 
option would behave just like the bond with compulsory conversion.   
The second and more serious problem is that the conversion terms are 
not specified at the time of issue.  In other words, neither the exact 
time of conversion nor the conversion ratio (i.e. the number of equity 
shares into which each bond is to be converted) are prespecified.   
These are left to be determined at a subsequent stage by the 
Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) who is the government functionary 
entrusted with the regulation of issues of capital in the primary 
market. 
 
At first sight, an instrument like this defies rational valuation.   
Nevertheless, these instruments are actively traded in Indian capital 
markets, and the market does place a value upon them.  In fact, many 
practitioners and academics seem to think that all that is required is 
to form an estimate of the likely conversion terms and then value the 
bond as if these terms were prespecified.  Apart from this additional 
complication of estimating the expected conversion terms, the Indian 
convertible bond with unspecified terms should, in this view, behave 
like an ordinary convertible bond.   
 
In this paper, we examine the behaviour of market prices of one of the 
largest issues of Indian convertible bonds with unspecified terms, 
viz., Reliance Petrochemicals Limited (RPL).  We find that the 
behaviour of these prices is quite different from that of ordinary 
convertible bonds.  The fact that the terms are not prespecified makes 
a substantial qualitative difference to the pattern of price 
movements.  In a companion paper, Barua and Varma (1991), we present a 
theoretical model for the valuation of Indian convertible bonds using 
the general theory of derivative securities (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 
1985).  The empirical results in the current study are consistent with 









In September 1988, RPL made a public issue of Rs. 6000 million divided 
into Rs. 300 million of equity shares (face value Rs. 10 each), Rs. 
1200 million of Part B bonds (face value Rs. 40 each) and Rs. 4500 
million of Part C bonds (face value Rs. 150 each).  Both B and C bonds 
carried an interest rate of 12.5%.  This interest rate is well below 
the market interest rate on non convertible bonds of comparable 
default risk; the investor clearly expected to be compensated for this 
by conversion into equity at favourable terms.  B bonds were 
convertible 3 to 4 years after allotment, while for C bonds the 
conversion was after 5 to 7 years.  Both bonds were wholly convertible 
into equity, but the terms of conversion (i.e. the conversion price, 
or equivalently, the number of equity shares to be allotted on 
conversion) were left to be determined by the CCI.  Both bonds are 
actively traded on the stock markets. 
 
The period of study is from February 1989 to October 1990; we have 
collected daily prices for this period giving us more than 330 sets of 
prices. 
 
The Naive Model 
 
The value of the convertible bond is the sum of two components: the 
present value of all interest payments receivable till conversion, and 
the present value of the shares to be received on conversion.  Based 
on the yield to maturity (ytm) prevalent on corporate bonds in the 
Indian markets, and an assessment of the perceived riskiness of RPL, 
we can estimate the first component by discounting the interest 
payments at an interest rate of 22%.  For this purpose, we assume that 
the conversion will take place at the end of the permissible period, 
i.e., 4 years after allotment for B and 7 years after allotment for C. 
  In other words, we ignore, for the purpose of the study, the 
uncertainty attached to the conversion date itself.  Subtracting the 
present value obtained by this discounting process from the market 
prices of the bonds, we get the implicit value that the market 
attaches to the conversion.  Most of our analysis is based on these 
conversion values which we denote by VB and VC respectively.  Our 
analysis indicates that our subsequent results are not very sensitive 
to the assumptions made in valuing the interest coupons.  The main 
impact of any error will be to alter the conversion value of the bonds 
by almost a constant amount throughout the time period under study.   
 
If the conversion terms were prespecified then the conversion value 
should be simply the conversion ratio times the current stock price.  
If, for example, the B bonds are to be converted into KB equity shares, 
then VB should be equal to KB*S where S is the stock price.  This 
simple result holds because the conversion is compulsory; there is no 





model of Black and Scholes (1973).  (We ignore the future dividends on 
the share upto the conversion date since RPL had not paid any 
dividends during the period under study, and the possibility of 
dividends in the immediate future were not very bright). 
 
The naive model simply assumes that the market forms an estimate of 
the conversion ratio and then uses that ratio as if it were 
prespecified.  The naive model thus asserts that VB equals KB times S 
where KB (the expected conversion ratio) is a constant to be estimated. 
 
 
Testing the Naive Model 
 
Though we do not know the market's estimate of KB, we can, according to 
the naive model, estimate this by simply running a linear regression 
of VB on S.  This linear regression does not, however, help us in 
testing the naive model as the model does not make any strong 
predictions about the regression slope.  We have only the trivial 
prediction that the slope should be positive.  The linear regression 
would lead to testable implications only if we can form an independent 
estimate of KB. 
 
We can, however, obtain a strong testable implication from the naive 
model by taking logarithms in the equation: 
 




ln(VB) = ln(KB) + ln(S) 
 
Since KB is constant, we get 
 
 
d ln(VB)        
───────  =   1 
d ln(S)     
 
Stated in words, the elasticity of VB with respect to S equals unity.  
As usual, elasticity is the percentage change in one variable when the 
other variable changes by one percent.  The testable implication is 
that if we regress the logarithm of the conversion value on the 
logarithm of the stock price, the regression slope should be equal to 
unity.   
 
This test can readily be carried out.  Statistically, however, a 
regression of this kind is prone to spurious correlations arising from 
time trends in the data.  For example, if both VB and S are rising over 
time, the regression would produce a significant coefficient which is 





towards the second half of 1990 as part of the overall boom in the 
stock market.  This does lead to a considerable degree of spurious 
correlation.  To avoid this problem, the preferred methodology is to 
difference both the variables and run the regression in terms of 
differences (changes) rather than levels. In our case, there is the 
added advantage that the change in the logarithm of prices or values 
is interpretable as the logarithmic return.  (The logarithmic return 
is defined as the logarithm of the price ratio; for example, the log 
return on S is defined as ln(St/St-1) which is clearly equal to ln(St)-
ln(St-1)).  We are thus led to formulate our estimable regression model 
as follows: 
 
Bret = a + b*Sret 
 
where Bret is the (log) return on the B bond (net of coupon values) 
and Sret is the (log) return on the share.  A similar model is 
formulated for the C bond. 
 
The regression results were as follows: 
 
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│Bret =  0.002 + 0.505 Sret        R
2 = .156  F(1,331) = 60.99 │ 
│       (0.58)  (7.81)                        P = 0.000        │ 
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ 
│Cret = -0.001 + 0.417 Sret        R
2 = .187  F(1,327) = 75.03 │ 
│       (-0.37)  (8.66)                       P = 0.000        │ 
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
T statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The result is, of course, a convincing rejection of the naive model.  
The slopes (elasticities) are 0.505 and 0.417 for B and C 
respectively; these are approximately half of the predicted value of 
unity .  The hypothesis that the slope is equal to unity is rejected 
at the 0.1% level for both B and C (T-Statistics of 7.62 and 12.15 
respectively). 
 
The rejection of the naive model is essentially a rejection of the 
hypothesis that the market's expectation of the conversion ratio is 
constant over time.  In looking for alternatives to the naive model, 
we have to focus on the changes in this market expectation. 
 
CCI's Policy: Conversion Ratio Could Depend on the Stock Price 
 
A crucial assumption in deriving equation (1) is that KB and S are 
uncorrelated.  This requires that KB should not itself depend on S.  If 
there were such a dependence, we will have: 
 
d ln(VB)   d ln(KB)   d ln(S)     d ln(KB)  
───────  = ──────── + ───────  =  ──────── + 1 






Stated in words, the elasticity of VB with respect to S equals unity 
plus the elasticity of KB with respect to S.  Our empirical result 
could be explained if this latter elasticity were negative; that is to 
say if the conversion ratio were negatively related to the stock 
price. 
 
To see why such a dependence may indeed be present we must look at 
what policies the CCI might follow while fixing the conversion terms. 
  
 
During the period under study, the interest rates on corporate bonds 
were subject to a ceiling fixed by the government.  The ceiling rate 
on convertible bonds was lower than that on ordinary bonds.  To 
compensate for this, the conversion was usually at favourable terms; 
on conversion, the bondholder received equity shares with a market 
value exceeding the face value of the bond.  Typically, conversion at 
favourable terms acts like a redemption premium that boosts the 
effective yield on the convertible bond above even the ceiling rate on 
ordinary bonds.  The investor in Indian convertible bonds has thus 
come to expect a substantial part of his return to come from the 
conversion.  
 
In fact, part of the rationale for leaving the conversion terms to be 
determined subsequently by the CCI rather than specifying them at the 
time of issue was to ensure that the conversion terms are favourable 
not only ex-ante but also ex-post.  This is the context in which the 
CCI operates.   
 
The CCI can, therefore, be expected to look closely at the value of 
the shares being transferred to the bondholders.  The CCI would want 
to ensure that the conversion ratio times the market price of the 
share exceeds the face value of the bond by an amount adequate to 
compensate the bondholder for the low interest rate that he has 
received till conversion.  He can do this quite simply by setting the 
conversion ratio equal to the target redemption value divided by the 
market price of the share at the time of conversion. 
 
For example, the market might expect the Part B bond to be converted 
into shares having a value at conversion of MB.  In this case, VB 
should equal the present value of MB regardless of the current share 
price.  A regression against the equity price would then yield a slope 
of zero.   
 
The assumption that KB is inversely proportional to S and therefore VB 
is independent of S is, perhaps, as extreme as the assumption that KB 
is independent of S and therefore VB is proportional to S.  It would be 
more realistic to assume that VB would rise as S rises, but less than 
proportionately.  If RPL is doing very well and the share prices are 





holders but not all. The reason would be that the CCI may not wish the 
bond holders to obtain an unreasonable gain over and above the 
compensation for the lower coupon rate of interest.   
 
Another way of looking at this situation is to regard the CCI as 
fixing not the conversion ratio but the conversion price (the price of 
the share for conversion purposes).  The conversion ratio would then 
equal the face value divided by this conversion price.  This would 
suggest that the CCI could use the same guidelines for share valuation 
that he has evolved for valuation of shares for various other 
purposes.  The market price of the share is one of the inputs in 
determining fair value in accordance with these guidelines, but not 
the only one, nor even necessarily the most important one (Varma and 
Venkiteswaran, 1990).   
 
What does all this mean for the elasticities of VB and KB with respect 
to S?  If the CCI is expected to adjust the conversion ratio so as to 
transfer a fixed value, the elasticity of KB would equal -1 reducing 
the elasticity of VB to 0.  If the CCI is expected to adopt a fixed 
conversion ratio regardless of the share price, the elasticity of KB 
would equal 0 so that the elasticity of VB equals 1.  In general, one 
would expect the regression slope (elasticity of VB) to lie between 0 
and 1 implying a range of -1 to 0 for the elasticity of KB. 
 
Our earlier empirical results indicate an elasticity of 0.505 for VB 
and of 0.417 for VC implying elasticities of -0.495 and -0.583 for KB 
and KC.  These values are near the middle of the range of values within 
which we should expect the elasticities to lie.  The regression 
results appear to show that when the share price rises by one percent, 
the market expects the conversion ratios for both bonds to fall by 
roughly half a percent.  The market seems to expect the conversion 
ratio to be a decreasing function of the share price but decreasing 
less than proportionately.   
 
 
Reverse Causation: The Dilution Effect 
 
 
There is, however, an entirely different reason for a negative 
elasticity of the conversion ratio with respect to the stock price.   
Not only does the share price influence the conversion ratio, but 
there is a reverse causation also.  The expected conversion ratio does 
influence the value of the equity share because of the dilution 
effect.  As pointed out in the beginning, the face value of the B and 
C bonds together amount to Rs. 5700 million as against the face value 
of the equity of Rs. 300 million.  Even if the conversion is at a very 
high conversion price, the shares allotted on conversion can be 
expected to be several times the original number of shares.  The 
market price of the equity share would reflect this dilution.   





value of RPL as a whole (value of the firm, as it is called in finance 
theory), subtracting the value of all debt including the coupons on B 
and C bonds, and dividing the balance by the fully diluted share 
capital.  If the market receives any information which suggests that 
the CCI is likely to grant a higher conversion ratio to the bond 
holder, then, the value of the firm remaining unchanged, the market 
price of the share must decline as the fully diluted share capital is 
now larger than it was earlier expected to be. 
 
One can now think of two kinds of information coming to the market.  
First, there is information about the value of RPL itself (i.e. 
information about its project implementation, business prospects, 
etc.).  This information changes the value of the firm, and causes the 
value of the equity and the bonds to change in the same direction but 
not necessarily by the same percentage.  The bond values would change 
by a smaller percentage if the market expects the conversion ratios to 
change as a result of the change in share values.  Hence, the return 
to bonds would be less than the returns to equity holders leading to a 
slope of less than one in our regressions.  Second, there is 
information that comes in to the market about the likely stand of the 
CCI on the conversion ratios.  This information may be in terms of the 
valuation used by the CCI in public issues or other conversion cases. 
  It may also be information about the likely political situation in 
the country considering the high political profile of the Reliance 
group.  Any such information would cause the share and bond prices to 
move in opposite directions.  For example, information suggesting that 
the CCI may grant a higher conversion ratio would cause the equity to 
fall to reflect the higher dilution, while the bonds rise. 
 
The regression slopes (elasticities of VB and VC) would thus be 
conditioned by both these factors.  One causing a strictly positive 
relationship which may be of less than unit slope while the other 
causes a negative relationship.  It is, therefore, interesting to 
examine whether the observed slope of about half results from the 
positive relationship itself having a low slope or whether a slope 
close to unity in the positive relationship is being counterbalanced 
by a strong negative component.  This requires an indirect 
methodology. 
 
Disentangling the Dilution Effect 
 
It is usual in finance theory to regress security returns on the 
market returns (i.e. returns on a market index) in what is commonly 
called the market model.  This model has its theoretical foundation in 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  The regression on the market 
return captures the effect of economy wide factors like inflation, GNP 
growth etc. which can be expected to influence the returns on all 
companies in general.  The regression coefficient in the market model 
(beta) measures the responsiveness of the security to market wide 





company specific factors unrelated to market wide movements.  The 
market model thus allows us to decompose the total return in any 
security into two parts related to market wide information and company 
specific information respectively. 
 
We would argue that the market wide information is essentially about 
the value of the firm.  The company specific information could be 
either about the value of the firm or about the CCI attitudes.  By 
using the market model, we can thus look at the impact on share and 
bond prices of information affecting only the value of the firm 
untainted by any information about the CCI's likely policy on 
conversion ratios. 
 
We first run the market model for the share and for both bonds. 
 
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ 
│Sret = -0.003 + 1.307 Mret        R
2 = .204  F(1,331) = 84.21 │ 
│       (-1.31) (9.18)                        P = 0.000        │ 
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ 
│Bret = -0.001 + 1.551 Mret        R
2 = .164  F(1,331) = 64.84 │ 
│       (-0.24) (8.05)                        P = 0.000        │ 
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ 
│Cret = -0.002 + 0.994 Sret        R
2 = .118  F(1,327) = 43.76 │ 
│       (-0.84)  (6.62)                       P = 0.000        │ 
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
T statistics are in parentheses.                                 
 
The betas are 1.307, 1.551 and 0.994 for the share, the B bond and the 
C bond respectively.  The beta coefficients indicate the 
responsiveness of the securities to market wide information.  If we 
divide the betas of B and C by the beta of the share, we can compute 
the response of B and C to a one percent change in the share price 
induced by market wide information.  This ratio is 1.551/1.307 = 1.187 
for B and 0.994/1.307 = 0.761 for C.  These ratios are much higher 
than the slopes of about half that we obtained in the earlier 
regression.  One of the ratios is less than unity, and the other 
greater than unity, and we are unable to statistically reject the 
hypothesis that the two slopes are in fact equal to unity.  (The T-
Statistic for testing equality of the betas of the share and the B 
bond is 1.018; the corresponding statistic for the C bond is -1.515). 
 
To examine the effect of company specific information, we regress the 
bond returns simultaneously on the share returns and the market 
return.  In this multiple regression model, the coefficient of the 
share return represents the impact of information specific to RPL. 
 







│Bret =  0.000 + 0.381 Sret + 0.795 Mret              R
2 = .192 │ 
│       (0.04)  (5.34)        (3.85)     F(2,328)=38.95 P=0.000 │ 
├───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ 
│Cret = -0.001 + 0.371 Sret + 0.291 Mret              R
2 = .195 │ 
│       (-0.60) (6.88)        (1.86)     F(2,324)=39.28 P=0.000 │ 
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
T statistics are in parentheses. 
 
The coefficients of the share return are now well below half; the 
indicated elasticity of KB is -0.619 and that of KC is -0.629.  The 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the share return are equal to 
unity is once again convincingly rejected at the 0.1% level (T-
Statistics of 8.68 and 11.66 respectively). 
 
These results enable us to identify the source of the negative 
correlation between K and S that led to the rejection of the naive 
model in the first place.  First of all, there is no firm evidence of 
the dependence of K on S through the CCI's policy of ensuring a fair 
conversion value.  If K were dependent on S in that manner, then any 
change in S, market related or not, should cause K to move in the 
opposite direction.  Our empirical results show that when we look at 
market related changes in S, we are unable to reject the hypothesis 
that K is independent of S.  The elasticity of V with respect to S as 
measured by the ratio of the bond beta to the share beta is not 
statistically significantly different from unity.  We would like to 
add though that the standard errors of the betas are somewhat large 
and we hesitate to say that the data rejects the hypothesis that the 
CCI is expected to adjust the conversion ratio on the basis of the 
actual market price of the share.  We prefer to make the more cautious 
statement that there is no statistical evidence for this hypothesis. 
 
We have strong evidence for the presence of the dilution effect which 
predicts that exogenous changes in K cause S to change in the opposite 
direction.  This is reflected in the fact that the negative elasticity 
between K and S which is present when we consider all changes in S 
disappears when we consider only market related changes where the 
dilution effect is absent.  The negative elasticity becomes even more 
pronounced when we consider non market related changes where the 
dilution effect is expected to be stronger. 
 







│            │ Elast. │ Elast. │ Elast. │ Elast. │ 
│            │ of VB  │ of KB  │ of  VC  │ of KC  │ 
├───────────────────────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┤ 
│Market related changes     │ 1.187  │  0.187 │ 0.761  │ -0.239 │ 
│in stock price             │        │        │        │        │ 
├───────────────────────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┤ 
│Non market related changes │ 0.381  │ -0.619 │ 0.371  │ -0.629 │ 
│in stock price             │        │        │        │        │ 
├───────────────────────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┤ 
│All changes in stock price │ 0.505  │ -0.495 │ 0.417  │ -0.583 │ 





Our empirical results show that the convertible bond with unspecified 
terms is quite different from the ordinary convertible bond.  We find 
that, with unspecified terms, the implications for the bond value of 
changes in stock price are quite complex, and require a 
disentanglement of the different sources of changes in stock price.   
 
While the normal convertible bond is expected to move in tandem with 
the share, the bond with unspecified terms can and does move in an 
opposite direction.  The empirical data shows that the market does 
revise its expectation of the likely conversion terms on the basis of 
whatever fresh information it receives.  If such information causes 
the market to revise the expected conversion ratio upward (downward), 
the bond price rises (falls) and, because of the dilution effect, the 
stock price falls (rises).  The empirical evidence that this effect is 
very pronounced indicates that the market does face considerable 
uncertainty about the likely conversion terms.  This is a wholly 
needless source of uncertainty that has been created solely by the 
government's policy of encouraging the issuing corporation not to 
prespecify the conversion terms. 
 
One of the justifications for the unspecified terms was that the CCI 
could ensure that the conversion terms are "fair" ex-post and not 
merely ex-ante.  In other words, the CCI fixing the conversion terms 
at the time of conversion could ensure that the bondholders do not 
suffer from a severe adverse movement of the share price between issue 
and conversion.  The empirical data does not provide any evidence that 
the market expects the CCI to protect their interests in this fashion. 
 We are unable to statistically reject the hypothesis that the CCI is 
not expected to play any such moderating role. 
 
This study, therefore, shows that unspecified terms have only added to 
the uncertainty of the bondholders without giving them any perceived 
benefits.  The implication for government policy is that the system of 






In a companion paper, Barua and Varma (1991) have presented a 
theoretical model for the valuation of the convertible bond with 
unspecified conversion terms.  That valuation model contains an 
unobservable state variable representing the market's expectation 
about the CCI's policy which makes it difficult to test the valuation 
equation itself.  The principal testable implication of the model is 
that the elasticity of V with respect to S would be highest for market 
related changes in S, lowest for non market related changes, and in 
between for all changes put together.  All these elasticities are 
predicted to be less than or equal to unity.  These predictions of the 
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